Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A Comment on the Heightened Threshold and the Proposal of the "Burden Plus" Standard by Geyer, Thomas E.
COMMENT
Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A Comment
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of the "Burden Plus" Standard
I. INTRODUCrION
... one nation, under God, indivisible,
with liberty and justice for all.
As the concluding lines of the Pledge of Allegiance indicate, "[we] are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."' Indeed, "[t]he
fact that the Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God and that the
unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in their writings,
from the Mayflower Compact to the Constitution itself."'2
The charter protection of religious freedom is the religion clause of the first
amendment, which provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' 3 As the text itself
indicates, there are two threshold aspects to the free exercise clause: the requirement
that "religion" be implicated and the requirement that the exercise of that religion be
"prohibited."
These threshold requirements to the invocation of the free exercise clause have
been the subject of two recent United States Supreme Court decisions. In Frazee v.
Illinois Department of Employment Security,4 the Court upheld a free exercise claim,
refusing to raise the religion aspect of the threshold. However, in Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Association,5 the Court rejected a free exercise claim by
heightening the prohibit threshold requirement that must be shown to invoke the free
exercise clause.
This Comment will focus on the Lyng case and the larger context of the
narrowing scope of the protection given by the free exercise clause. More impor-
tantly, this Comment will propose and discuss a new threshold standard to be used by
both the bench and the bar to examine future free exercise claims. This new standard
is proposed in response to what has been called the "inadequacies of current
doctrine" in free exercise jurisprudence. 6 Section II of this Comment will examine
the background of the free exercise clause and will offer a brief discussion of the
balancing test used once constitutional protection is invoked. Section III will explore
the major case law interpretation of the threshold requirement of the clause, with a
special emphasis on the interpretation of the key word "prohibit." Section IV will
discuss both the Lyng and Frazee cases and provide a critical analysis of the resultant
current threshold standard. Section V will propose the "Burden Plus" standard as a
1. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1951).
2. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213 (1962).
3. U.S. COisT. amend. I.
4. 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989).
5. 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
6. McConnell & Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1,2(1989).
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workable analytical framework that can be used to determine the propriety of
invoking the free exercise clause in future cases. 7 In addition, Section V will apply
the Burden Plus standard to demonstrate that it is a superior analytical framework.
Further, some substantial advantages of the standard will be discussed and some
potential criticisms will be rebutted.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Text
The constitutional manifestation of religious liberty, set forth in the first
amendment, reads, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.', 8 This "religion clause" of the first
amendment has two distinct parts: the "establishment clause" and the "free exercise
clause." The religion clause is applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. 9
In examining the significance to be attached to the religion clause, it is useful to
examine the context in which it was proposed and ratified. The Framers of the
Constitution sought "to protect American liberty by establishing a limited federal
government that [would] be permitted to act only where it had an explicit mandate to
act." 0 However, the limited nature of the new government was not seen as a
sufficient guarantee of the religious and civil liberties of the people." James
Madison, a principal architect of the Constitution, proposed to Congress a set of
constitutional amendments aimed at insuring protection of religious liberty, among
other things.12
As a general proposition, the first amendment sought to prevent any federal
interference with religion. The Supreme Court has noted that the purpose of the
religion clause "was to state an objective, not to write a statute.' 3 Thus, the courts
7. The proposal of such new free exercise standards is currently in vogue among legal scholars. Noted free
exercise commentator Professor Ira C. Lupu proposes a new standard in his recent article, Lupu, Where Righis Begin: The
Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise ofReligion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933 (1989). Professor Lupu's fascinating article
critiques the prevailing judicial definitions of "burden" and proposes what he calls a "common law" approach:
- [w]herever religious activity is met by intentional government action analogous to that which, if committed by a private
party, would be actionable under general principles of law, a legally cognizable burden on religion is present." Id. at 966.
With all due deference, the Burden Plus standard proposed in this Comment has two main advantages over Professor
Lupu's standard. First, the Burden Plus standard reconciles existing precedent. Second, while Professor Lupu's standard
is centered on oftentimes amorphous common law concepts, the Burden Plus standard is centered on the concrete "Plus"
concept. See infra text accompanying notes 124-65.
Another standard has been proposed in McConnell & Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious
Freedom, 56 U. CHt. L. REv. 1 (1989). Again, the problem with such an economic approach is the difficulty of
quantifying the costs and benefits involved in a free exercise claim. In contrast, the Burden Plus standard does not depend
on attempted quantification, but rather on the existence of recognized legal rights or entitlements. See infra text
accompanying notes 124-65.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
10. G. MILLER, RELioious LIBERTY uN AMERIcA 74 (1976).
11. Id.
12. See generally T. CutuY, THE FiRST FEREDo, s 193-222 (1986) [hereinafter Cuixv].
13. Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1969).
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were "left with the task of developing rules and principles to realize the goal of the
religion clauses without freezing them into an overly rigid mold." 14
The provision for "free exercise" can be accurately viewed as the most
progressive part of the amendment. One commentator has noted, "the government
was obliged under this phrase to avoid actions that would interfere with the practice
of faith in areas under its jurisdiction; that is, it was a guarantee of the liberty to
practice one's faith."' 5 It is with this notion that the free exercise clause comes in
conflict, and creates a tension, with the establishment clause.
Government action arguably prohibited by the establishment clause may in some
cases be compelled by the free exercise clause. Constitutional law scholar Professor
Laurence Tribe has described the free exercise clause as carving a "zone of
permissible accommodation" out of the establishment clause. 16 This phenomenon
was most recently demonstrated in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of
Florida17 in which the Supreme Court, following solid precedent,' 8 held that the
award of unemployment compensation benefits to Mrs. Hobbie after she was
discharged for refusing to work on her Sabbath day was not in violation of the
establishment clause, but was in fact required by the free exercise clause.
Fundamentally, then, the text of the free exercise clause should be seen as
protecting freedom of belief by preventing any government interference with respect
to religious beliefs. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently stated, "[o]ur cases have
long recognized a distinction between the freedom of individual belief, which is
absolute, and the freedom of individual conduct, which is not absolute."' 9 The
absolute protection with respect to belief should be seen as extending to protect
against any indirect interference with belief that may result from subtle discriminatory
activity. 20
Although religious beliefs are protected absolutely by the free exercise clause,
religious activities are not. As the Supreme Court in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association2' noted, "[t]he crucial word in the constitutional
text is 'prohibit.'"22 Under free exercise clause jurisprudence, if a claimant shows
religious sincerity and the requisite burden resulting from a prohibition of a religious
activity, the threshold is met and the court will undertake a balancing test to
determine if the government interest manifested by its action is important enough to
justify the resulting intrusion on the claimant's religious activity. Therefore, before
the interpretation of the threshold is examined, it is appropriate to offer a brief
discussion of the balancing test used once the constitutional threshold is met.
14. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUtiONAL L W § 14-2 (2nd ed. 1988) [hereinafter TRIBE].
15. MLLER, supra note 10, at 76.
16. TRIBE, supra note 14, at § 14-4.
17. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
18. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707 (1981).
19. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986).
20. See infra text accompanying note 113.
21. 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
22. Id. at 1326.
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B. Balancing Test23
The "modern" free exercise clause standard originated in Sherbert v. Verner24
when the Court extended protection beyond mere belief. Sherbert was a Seventh Day
Adventist who was fired for refusing to work on Saturdays, her religion's day of rest.
When she failed to make herself available for other work on Saturdays, the State of
South Carolina denied her unemployment compensation benefits. The Supreme Court
held that such a denial violated Sherbert's right to the free exercise of her religion. 25
The Court stated that "[g]overnmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind
of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against
[Sherbert] for her Saturday worship.' '26
The existence of the burden itself, however, was not enough to provide free
exercise clause protection for religious activity. Rather, the Court went on to
"consider whether some compelling state interest . . . justifies the substantial
infringement of [Sherbert's] First Amendment right.' '27 The Sherbert Court imposed
a "strict scrutiny" 2 8 balancing test and found the denial of benefits to be unconsti-
tutional when no "compelling interest" was advanced as a justification.2 9
Nonetheless, the holding in Sherbert left unanswered the question whether a
statutory scheme which applied equally to everyone, not subject to such charges of
facial discrimination, violated the free exercise clause. In Wisconsin v. Yoder 30 the
Court considered such a nondiscriminatory statute: Wisconsin's requirement that all
children attend school until they reach the age of sixteen. Because of a sincerely held
religious tenet, 3' the Amish respondents objected to compulsory formal education
beyond the eighth grade. The Court found that such a requirement burdened the
23. The following discussion is by no means meant to be comprehensive, since the focus of this Comment is on
the threshold to the invocation of the free exercise clause. For recent commentary on the standard of review in free
exercise cases, see Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent Developments,
27 Wt. & MARY L. Rev. 943 (1986) and Kamenshine, Scrapping Strict Review in Free Exercise Cases, 4 CoNsr.
CommEumNrrY 147 (1987).
24. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). "Modem" in the sense that while today it is taken for granted that the free exercise
clause protects certain religious activity, Sherbert was the first case in which activity was protected. For example, in
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), the Court stated, "[l]aws are made for the government of actions, and
while they cannot interfere with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may with practices." Id. at 166. The Court went
on to hold that a conviction for polygamy was not a prohibition of the free exercise of the Mormon religion. Another
example is Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), in which the action of offering religious books for sale was
not given free exercise clause protection when offered by a minor in contravention of the state child labor law.
25. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
26. Id. at 404.
27. Id. at 406.
28. This phrase was developed in the context of the Supreme Court's Equal Protection analysis. Under "strict
scrutiny," the government is required to demonstrate that its action is the least restrictive means of advancing a
compelling state interest. The Court explicitly recognized in Hobble v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480
U.S. 136 (1987), that "strict scrutiny" is used to examine alleged infringements on free exercise rights: "such
infringements must be subjected to strict scrutiny and [can] be justified only by proof by the State of a compelling
interest." Id. at 141; see infra text accompanying note 46. See also TRisE, supra note 14, at § 14-13.
29. Specifically, the interest advanced by the state was "a possibility that the filing of fraudulent claims by
unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work might not only dilute the unemployment
compensation fund but also hinder the scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
30. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
31. ".... a fundamental belief that salvation requires life in a church community separate and apart from the world
and worldly influence." Id. at 210.
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respondents' right to the free exercise of their religion, stating, "a State's interest in
universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing
process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those
specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause .... "32 The Yoder Court stated
the balancing test in the following seminal language: "Only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the
free exercise of religion." 33 Although still considered "strict scrutiny," this test
arguably held the state to a standard higher than the "compelling interest" standard
of Sherbert.34 The Court in Yoder found that requiring two more years of compulsory
education was not "of the highest order" and thus required the state to create an
exemption for the Amish people.
The exact language used to describe the balancing test in Yoder was used six
years later in McDaniel v. Paty.3 5 There, the Court struck down Tennessee's ban on
clergy serving in the state legislature as violative of the free exercise clause when the
state failed to show that the anti-establishment interests promoted by the statute were
of the "highest order." 36
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division37
involved the denial of unemployment benefits to Thomas, who refused, after a
change in the nature of his employer's operation, to work in contravention of his
religious beliefs in a munitions operation. The Court cited the Yoder language and
went on to describe the balancing test in this manner: "The state may justify an
inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving
some compelling state interest." 38 As in Sherbert, the Court found the state interest
insufficient to justify denial of unemployment benefits. 39
The free exercise balance, however, has not always weighed in favor of the
claimant. In United States v. Lee4° the Amish respondent Lee "failed to withhold
social security taxes from his employees or to pay the employer's share of such taxes
because he believed that payment of the taxes and receipt of the benefits would
violate the Amish faith." 4 ' The Court applied a balancing test that was arguably even
32. Id. at 214.
33. Id. at 215.
34. Id. See supra text accompanying note 27.
35. 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978).
36. Tennessee asserts that its interest in preventing the establishment of a state religion is consistent with the
Establishment Clause and thus [is] of the highest order.... Tennessee has failed to demonstrate that its views
of the dangers of clergy participation in the political process have not lost whatever validity they may once have
enjoyed.
Id.
37. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
38. Id. at 718. Of course this is the classic strict scrutiny language, see supra note 28.
39. The purposes urged to sustain the disqualifying provisions of the Indiana unemployment compensation
scheme are two-fold: (1) to avoid the widespread unemployment and the consequent burden on the fund
resulting if people were permitted to leave jobs for "personal" reasons; and (2) to avoid a detailed probing by
employers into job applicants' religious beliefs. These are by no means unimportant considerations. When the
focus of the inquiry is properly narrowed, however, we must conclude that the interests advanced by the State
do not justify the burden placed on free exercise of religion.
Id. at 718-19 (footnote omitted).
40. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
41. Id.
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stricter than the Yoder test, stating, "[tihe state may justify a limitation on religious
liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental
interest.'"42 Nevertheless, the Court found that the governmental interest in admin-
istration of the social security system outweighed the free exercise claim,43 especially
in light of the fact that "Congress already has granted the Amish a limited exemption
from social security taxes."44
The most recent exposition of the balancing test is in Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Commission of Florida.45 The facts were similar to those in Sherbert in that
Hobbie was denied unemployment benefits for her refusal, because of religious
beliefs, to work on Saturdays. Relying on both Sherbert and Thomas, the Court
reversed the denial and stated that "such infringements must be subjected to strict
scrutiny and [can] be justified only by proof by the State of a compelling interest."46
In so doing, the Court rejected the Appeals Commission's argument that the proper
balancing test was a less rigorous one. The Commission claimed that "the Gov-
ernment meets its burden when it demonstrates that a challenged requirement for
governmental benefits, neutral and uniform in its application, is a reasonable means
of promoting a legitimate public interest." 47
This less rigorous test comes from a4 s chink in the strict scrutiny armor worn by
a free exercise claimant, the 1986 Supreme Court decision in Bowen v. Roy.49 There,
the Court held that the requirement of federal benefit programs that state agencies use
social security numbers in administration of the programs did not violate the free
exercise clause. Roy had objected, based upon a religious tenet, to use of such a
number. The Court stated, "[n]ever to our knowledge has the Court interpreted the
First Amendment to require the Government itself to behave in ways that the
individual believes will further his or her spiritual development .... "50 The Court
went on to apply the aforementioned "minimal scrutiny" reasonableness standard,
42. Id. at 257 (emphasis added).
43. "Thus, the Government's interest in assuring mandatory and continuous participation in and contribution to the
social security system is very high .... To maintain an organized society that guarantees religious freedom to a great
variety of faiths requires that some religious practices yield to the common good." Id. at 258-59.
44. Id. at 262. See 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g).
45. 480 U.S. 136 (1987). The Supreme Court made no mention of the balancing test in the most recent free exercise
clause case, Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989). Rather, Frazee's free exercise claim
for unemployment benefits was upheld on the authority of Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobble once the Court held that the
religion threshold was met by the mere showing of sincerity. See infra text accompanying notes 64-67.
46. 480 U.S. at 141.
47. Id.
48. I say "a" chink, meaning "one," because two other recently decided cases also invoke a less rigorous review
of the infringement upon free exereise. However, both cases were decided in "special contexts": in Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), no balancing test was applied but rather the Court gave great deference to a military
regulation that prohibited the claimant from wearing a yarmulke while in uniform; meanwhile in O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342 (1987), the Court applied a "reasonableness" test and upheld a prison regulation that prevented the claimants
from attending a weekly Muslim religious service. See generally Dienes, When The First Amendment Is Not Preferred:
The Military and Other "Special Contexts", 56 U. CN. L. Rav. 779 (1988).
49. 476 U.S. 693 (1986). It should be noted that the use of this less rigorous balancing test, although it appeared
in Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion, was concurred with by only Justices Rehnquist and Powell. Id. at 695, 701-12.
Justice O'Connor dissented sharply to this proposition, stating, "[s]uch a test has no basis in precedent and relegates a
serious First Amendment value to the barest level of minimal scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause already provides."
Id. at 727 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50. Id. at 699 (emphasis in original).
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which easily weighed in favor of the government. In effect, internal government
procedures were exalted to the level of constitutional significance, as the Court
stated, "[t]he Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the
Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the
religious beliefs of particular citizens." 5'
As previously mentioned, however, the Court rejected the invitation to use the
less rigorous Roy standard in the Hobbie case, stating, "[s]uch a test has no basis in
precedent and relegates a serious First Amendment value to the barest level of
minimal scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause already provides.''52 This
seemingly limits the use of the less rigorous test to the facts of Roy. 5 3
To summarize, if the free exercise threshold is met, a court will undertake a strict
scrutiny balancing test to determine whether the infringement on the free exercise of
religion is justified. That is to say, a court will require the state to show that its action
is the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling state interest. Professor
Tribe has described this as "[t]he [r]equirement that the [s]tate [s]how that [o]nly
[u]niform [e]nforcement [c]an [a]chieve an [u]nusually [i]mportant [e]nd." 54 Of
course, if an exemption is the superior resolution, it is required. 55
III. AN EXAMINATION OF WHAT TYPES OF GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
HAVE CONSTITUTED A "PROHIBITION"
A. Introduction
Recall that the text of the free exercise clause provides two threshold require-
ments to invocation of the free exercise clause. First, "religion" must be implicated.
Second, the challenged action must "prohibit" the free exercise of that religion. For
ease of discussion, these threshold requirements will be referred to as the religion
threshold and the prohibit threshold, respectively.
B. Modern Era Interpretation of "Religion"
In "modern" free exercise jurisprudence, that is, since Sherbert v. Verner in
1963,56 the Court has avoided attempting to define "religion." Indeed, in Sherbert
the Court recognized "the prohibition against judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity
51. Id.
52. Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141. Actually, as mentioned in supra note 49, this language comes from Justice
O'Connor's opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in Roy.
53. However, as the reader will learn from section IV of this Article, the majority opinion in Lyng relied heavily
upon the reasoning in Roy (although in Lyng a balancing test was never applied since the Court found that the threshold
requirement of "prohibition" was not met).
54. TRIBE, supra note 14, at § 14-13.
55. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See also McConnell & Posner, An Economic Approach to
Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CI. L. REv. 1 (1989).
56. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). As used in the remainder of this Comment, "modem era" refers to the period after the
Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert. Sherbert was the dawn of the modem era because in Sherbert, the Court extended
free exercise protection beyond mere belief for the first time. See supra text accompanying notes 23-29.
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of religious beliefs." 57 In Wisconsin v. Yoder 58 the Court stated that "a determination
of what is a 'religious' belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may
present a most delicate question," 59 although it did go on to distinguish religion from
philosophy.6° In Thomas v. Review Board61 the Court stated the broadest "non-
definition:" "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection." 62 Unique to
Thomas was the fact that the claimant was admittedly "struggling" with his beliefs;
nevertheless, the Court held that "[c]ourts should not undertake to dissect religious
beliefs because ... [the] beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision that
a more sophisticated person might employ.' '63
It was against this backdrop that the Supreme Court expressly addressed the
issue of the requirement of the religion threshold in Frazee v. Illinois Department of
Employment Security.64 Frazee was similar to Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie in that
it involved the denial of unemployment benefits because of a refusal to work on the
Sabbath. However, the Frazee case was distinct in that Frazee, unlike Sherbert,
Thomas or Hobbie, "was not a member of an established religious sect or church, nor
did he claim that his refusal to work resulted from a 'tenet, belief or teaching of an
established religious body.' "65 But the Supreme Court refused to use this distinction
to distinguish Frazee from Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie. In reversing the denial of
unemployment benefits, the Frazee Court stated, "we reject the notion that to claim
the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, one must be responding to the commands
of a particular religious organization. Here, Frazee's refusal was based on a sincerely
held religious belief. Under our cases, he was entitled to invoke First Amendment
protection." ,66
In line with the judicial reluctance to dissect religious beliefs, Frazee established
that the requirement with respect to the religion threshold is satisfied if the claimant
can show that the religious belief at issue is sincerely held. So, with "religion" not
subject to judicial inquiry, this leaves "prohibit" as "the crucial word in the
constitutional text.' '67
57. Id. at 407.
58. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
59. Id. at 215.
60. [The very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on
matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests. Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims
because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority,
much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would
not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such
belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.
Id. at 215-16.
61. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
62. Id. at 714.
63. Id. at 715.
64. 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989).
65. Id. at 1516.
66. Id. at 1517 (footnote omitted).
67. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1326 (1988).
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C. Modern Era Interpretation of "Prohibit"
The seminal modern interpretation of "prohibit" occurred, not surprisingly, in
Sherbert v. Verner:69 "the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the
government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact
from the government.' '69 This established the principle that there must be affirmative
government action in order for a prohibition to exist. In Sherbert itself, as well as in
Thomas v. Review Board,70 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,71 and
Frazee v. Department of Employment,72 the Court held the affirmative denial of
unemployment benefits to be sufficient to "prohibit" the free exercise of religion.
The language in Sherbert, mentioned previously in the discussion of the balancing
test,73 that "government imposition . . . puts the same kind of burden upon...
religion as would a fine imposed against [Sherbert] for her Saturday worship," 7 4 was
directly relied upon in Thomas75 and Hobbie.7 6 Thus, "prohibit" is defined in terms
of burden.
In Hobbie, the Court explicitly stated, "the salient inquiry under the Free
Exercise Clause is the burden involved." 7 7 This general language represented a
relaxation of the burden standard announced in Yoder: that state action "gravely
endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents' religious beliefs." 7 8
Between Yoder and Hobbie the Court had stated in United States v. Lee 9 that
"not all burdens ... are unconstitutional.' 8 0 This merely suggests, however, that the
strict scrutiny balancing test will be undertaken once a burden is shown; it does not
require some minimal quantum of burden be shown. The Court's refusal to require
that some specific quantum of burden be shown is consistent with its refusal to
"dissect religious beliefs," for as Thomas demonstrates, a burden to one believer
may be trivial to another believer of the same faith.8 '
68. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Recall that Sherbert established the "modem" free exercise standard. See supra text
accompanying notes 23-29.
69. Id. at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring).
70. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
71. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
72. 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989).
73. See supra text accompanying note 26.
74. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
75. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716-17.
76. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 140 (1987).
77. Id. at 144.
78. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972).
79. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
80. Id. at 257.
81. Recall that in Thomas the claimant quit his job because of a religious conviction against war that prevented him
from working on and with munitions. There was a question whether this same conviction was held by Thomas' fellow
believers. Addressing this, the Court stated:
The Indiana Court also appears to have given significant weight to the fact that another Jehovah's Witness had
no scruples about working on tank turrets; for that other Witness, at least, such work was "scripturally"
acceptable. Intrafaith differences of that kind are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed, and the
judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences in relation to the Religion Clauses.
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715.
Similarly, Frazee established that one need not "be responding to the commands of a particular religious
organization" in order to claim the protection of the free exercise clause, as long as that religious belief is sincerely held.
Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 109 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (1989).
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The modern test for prohibition thus appears to be the Hobbie articulation that
"the salient inquiry under the Free Exercise Clause is the burden involved.'82 The
Court seems to be saying that the claimant need only show the existence of a burden.
Unless the case arises in a special context,8 3 the strict scrutiny balancing test will be
applied to determine if free exercise rights have been violated without inquiry into the
degree of the burden.
Bowen v. Roy8 4 illustrates, however, that another aspect must be considered.
Drawing on the Court's statement in Sherbert that "the Free Exercise Clause is
written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of
what the individual can exact from the government, '85 the Roy Court stated:
Never to our knowledge has the Court interpreted the First Amendment to require the
Government itself to behave in ways the individual believes will further his or her spiritual
development or that of his or her family. The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be
understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that
comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens. 86
This casts a degree of uncertainty upon the Hobbie burden standard, which merely
requires the existence of a burden, when actions of the federal government itself are
at issue. This uncertainty was apparently resolved in Lyng, a discussion of which
appears in the following section.
D. Summary
The words "religion" and "prohibit" represent the two threshold requirements
to the invocation of the free exercise clause. Frazee established that the religion
threshold is met simply by showing that the belief is of a religious nature and is
sincerely held. The prohibit threshold, notwithstanding the uncertainty cast by the
Roy opinion when federal government action is at issue, is met by demonstrating that
a burden has been placed upon the free exercise of religion. However, the Lyng
decision, discussed in the next section, raised the prohibit threshold significantly, at
least when federal government action is at issue, and at most in all cases.
IV. LYNG AND THE RESULTANT THRESHOLD STANDARD
A. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association8 7
1. Facts and Lower Court Dispositions
Seven nonprofit associations, four Native Americans, and two Sierra Club
members sought to prevent implementation of the United States Forest Service's
82. Hobble, 480 U.S. at 144. See supra text accompanying note 77.
83. See supra note 48 for a discussion of the two recent free exercise clause cases decided within "'special
contexts": Goldman in the military context and O'Lone in the prison context.
84. 476 U. S. 693 (1986). See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
85. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963).
86. Roy, 476 U.S. at 699 (emphasis in original).
87. 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
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plans to permit timber harvesting and road construction in the Chimney Rock section
of the Six Rivers National Forest. This area is known as "high country" and used by
Native Americans for site-specific religious purposes. The plaintiffs claimed that the
construction and harvesting plans violated rights protected by the free exercise clause
of the first amendment. Following exhaustion of administrative remedies, a suit was
filed in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California.
The District Court held that the proposed plans did violate the Native
Americans' rights protected by the free exercise clause. 88 The court first found that
the two threshold requirements were met. With respect to the religion threshold,
"[t]he Indian plaintiffs' claim that the high country is sacred is both sincerely held
and 'rooted in religious belief;' "89 and, with respect to the prohibit threshold, "[t]he
evidence establishes that . . . implementation of the . . [plans] would seriously
impair the Indian plaintiffs' use of the high country for religious practices.' 90
With the threshold passed, the District Court then applied the strict scrutiny
balancing test: "[o]nce a burden on the free exercise of religion is established, 'only
those interests of the highest order' can uphold the challenged government action." 91
Based upon explicit findings of fact, the District Court found that the balance
weighed in favor of the Native Americans. The court stated that "construction of the
[road) would not materially serve several of the claimed governmental interests" 92
and that "[tihe remaining interests defendants offer in support of construction of the
[road] fall far short of constituting the 'paramount interests' necessary to justify
infringement of plaintiffs' freedom of religion." 93 The court also held that "harvest-
ing timber from the [high country] would not serve any compelling interest.' 94 It
appeared that the District Court had undertaken the proper free exercise inquiry.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and vacated in
part.95 On rehearing, the Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part. 96 The court
undertook a de novo review of the Native Americans' first amendment claim 97 and
again found that the balance weighed in favor of the Native Americans. In
88. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F.Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
89. Id. at 594.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 595, using, of course, the familiar language from Yoder see supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
Note that the requirement that the state interest be of the "highest order" is a higher standard than the usual strict scrutiny
requirement of a "compelling" state interest.
92. Id. The road contemplated was a six mile paved segment through Chimney Rock that would allow completion
of a 75 mile road linking two California towns, Gasquet and Orleans (the G-O road). Id. at 589-90.
93. Id. at 596 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406).
94. Id.
95. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd in relevant part
on rehearing, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988).
96. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). For discussion of the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Northwest Indian, see Comment, Constitutional Law- Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson:
Indian Religious Sites Prevail Over Public Land Development, 62 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 125 (1986) and Note, American
Indian Sacred Religious Sites and Government Development: A Conventional Analysis in an Unconventional Setting, 85
Mtct. L. Rev. 771 (1987).
97. Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 691 n.3.
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distinguishing the case from the then recently decided case of Bowen v. Roy, 98 the
Court of Appeals stated: "the fact that the proposed government operations would
virtually destroy the plaintiff Indians' ability to practice their religion differentiates
this case from Bowen v. Roy. "99 The Supreme Court, however, took quite a different
view of the matter.
2. United States Supreme Court Holding
By a vote of five to three, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case. 0 0
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion explicitly rejected the Court of Appeals'
reasoning: "Even if we assume that we should accept the Ninth Circuit's prediction,
according to which the G-O road will 'virtually destroy the Indians' ability to practice
their religion' . . . the Constitution simply does not provide a principle that could
justify upholding respondents' legal claims." 1o
The majority opinion relied heavily upon Bowen v. Roy: l02 "[t]he building of a
road or the harvesting of timber ... cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the
use of a Social Security number in Roy. '1 03 The opinion declined respondents'
requests to distinguish the case from Roy on the ground that the infringement on
religious liberty here was "significantly greater''1 4 or on the ground that while in
Roy the government's conduct of its own internal affairs "did not interfere with his
ability to practice his religion," here the government conduct would "physically
[destroy] the . . . conditions . . . without which the [religious] practices cannot be
conducted." 105 Instead, the Court concluded:
These efforts to distinguish Roy are unavailing. This Court cannot determine the truth of the
underlying beliefs that led to the religious objections here or in Roy... and accordingly cannot
weigh the adverse effects on the [Native Americans]. Without the ability to make such
comparisons, we cannot say that the one form of incidental interference with an individual's
spiritual activities should be subjected to a different constitutional analysis than the other. M
The weakness of this conclusion is clear, based upon the discussion in section
III of this Comment. While it is true that the Court will not delve into the veracity of
religious beliefs, 0 7 this relates only to the threshold aspect of religion. Once the
religion threshold is met by a mere showing of sincerity,108 and the prohibit threshold
98. 476 U.S. 693 (1986). See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
99. Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 693 (emphasis added).
100. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988). Justice O'Connor authored the
majority opinion, Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined, and Justice
Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
101. Id. at 1326-27 (quoting Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 693).
102. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
103. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1325.
104. Id.
105. Id. Two other grounds on which to distinguish Roy suggested by the Native Americans were that "government
practice in Roy was 'purely mechanical' whereas this case involves 'a case-by-case substantive determination as to how
a particular unit of land will be managed'" as well as that "the government action is not at some physically removed
location where it places a restriction on what a practitioner may do." Id.
106. Id.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 56-67.
108. See supra text accompanying note 66.
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is also met, 0 9 then under heretofore normal free exercise praxis the Court applies a
balancing test. The balancing test weighing the adverse effects is applied regardless
of the fact that there was no inquiry into the truth of the underlying religious beliefs.
However, no balancing test was applied in Lyng. Rather, the Court held that the
Native Americans' free exercise claim failed because the prohibit threshold was not
met. The Court did find that the religion threshold was met,' t0 but such a finding was
effectively useless since both threshold requirements must be met to support a free
exercise claim. " I
In the beginning of the portion of its opinion that discussed the applicable law,
the Lyng Court frankly stated: "Respondents contend that the burden on their
religious practices is heavy enough to violate the Free Exercise Clause unless the
Government can demonstrate a compelling need to complete the G-O road or to
engage in timber harvesting in the [high country] area. We disagree."" 2
Thus, the uncertainty in the burden threshold created by Roy was confirmed in
Lyng, at least with respect to actions of the federal government:
It is true that this Court has repeatedly held that indirect coercion or penalties on the free
exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions, are subject to scrutiny under the First
Amendment . . . . This does not and cannot imply that incidental effects of government
programs, which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no
tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require
government to bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful actions."11
B. The Resultant Current Threshold Standard
There is no question that the decision in Lyng substantially heightened the
prohibit threshold required to bring a free exercise claim. To the majority, it was a
legitimate extension of Sherbert v. Verner: 1 4 "the crucial word in the constitutional
text is prohibit: for the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the
government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact
from the government." ' " 5 To the dissent, it was an unduly narrow interpretation of
"prohibit": "[t]he constitutional guarantee we interpret today, however, draws no
such fine distinctions between types of restraints on religious exercise, but rather is
directed against any form of governmental action that frustrates or inhibits religious
practice. 11 6 It is somewhat amazing that government action that will "virtually
destroy the Indians' ability to practice their religion' ""7 could be held not to prohibit
the free exercise thereof. 18
109. See supra text accompanying notes 68-86.
110. "It is undisputed that the Indian respondents' beliefs are sincere .... .- Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1324.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 56-86.
112. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1324.
113. Id. at 1326.
114. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See supra text accompanying notes 68-76.
115. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1326 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Id. at 1330 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
117. Id. at 1326 (quoting Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 693).
118. It also seems difficult to reconcile Justice O'Connor's position in Lyng, significantly raising the threshold
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Nonetheless, the threshold standard that results from Lyng requires that
something more than frustration or inhibition of religious practices be shown in order
for the threshold requirement of prohibition to be met. The resulting test probably
does not go as far as requiring that there be coercive compulsion of affirmative
conduct inconsistent with religious belief as the dissent suggests," 9 but that is beside
the main point that a new "bite" has been put in the threshold that had been
previously met by simply showing sincerity and the existence of a burden.
It should be noted that the Lyng Court made no attempt to raise the religion
threshold beyond the minimal showing of sincerity. Indeed, subsequent to Lyng, in
Frazee v. Department of Employment, 2 0 the Court explicitly refused to heighten the
religion threshold. In Frazee, the Court confirmed that the religion threshold is met
by the minimal showing of sincerity.' 2'
An argument can be made that the higher threshold standard established in Lyng
is limited to cases involving action by the federal government that impinges on
religious liberty. Further, it can be argued that Lyng was wrongly decided, that the
majority's interpretation of "prohibit" was unnecessarily and improperly narrow.
Still, in light of the fact that "[we] are a religious people,' ' 22 and as a result of Lyng,
there is a need for a clear analytical threshold standard that reconciles existing
precedent within the Supreme Court's current free exercise jurisprudence. Such a
standard, the "Burden Plus" standard, is proposed in the following section. Indeed,
as another commentator has recently noted, "[t]he concept of burden is thus
emerging as crucial in free exercise law."' 23
V. THE "BURDEN PLUS" STANDARD PROPOSED AND DisCUSSED
A. Introduction
Recall that the prohibit threshold of the free exercise clause has been defined in
terms of "burden. ' 124 The Burden Plus standard is proposed for use to determine
whether the prohibit threshold to the invocation of the free exercise clause is met, in
light of the substantial heightening of the threshold by the Supreme Court's decision
in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Association.125 Simply stated,
under the Burden Plus standard, the prohibit threshold to the invocation of the free
exercise clause is met if there is some "plus" factor in addition to governmental
interference with religion. As to the propriety of such a standard, it should be noted
requirement for free exercise protection, with her position in Roy, in which she vigorously dissented to the lessening of
the strict scrutiny balancing test traditionally applied after the free exercise threshold has been met.
119. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1330 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
122. See supra text accompanying note 1.
123. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REv. 933,
935 (1989).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 68-86.
125. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). See supra text accompanying notes 100-113.
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that the notion of a "plus" standard has been used previously in first amendment
jurisprudence. 12 6
The concept comes from a procedural due process case decided by the Supreme
Court, Paul v. Davis. 27 In Paul, the Court held that the liberty interest protected by
the due process clause in the fourteenth amendment 28 did not include Davis' own
interest in his "reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests."' 29 Thus,
a "reputation plus" standard was announced, meaning that the damage to reputation
must be accompanied by another deprivation in order to invoke the due process
safeguards. 130
It follows, then, that under the Burden Plus standard, in order to meet the
prohibit threshold the claimant must show a burden on religious activity' 3' plus
deprivation of some recognized right or entitlement. The question raised, of course,
is what are the parameters of "some recognized right or entitlement."
The seminal cases dealing with such parameters in the procedural due process
context are the "tenure cases:" Board of Regents v. Roth132 and Perry v. Sinder-
mann.133 In Roth, the Supreme Court found no due process-protected interest in a
nontenured assistant professor's claim that he deserved a hearing before a state
university declined to renew his contract. The Court reasoned that "to have a
property interest [such that procedural due process is required] ... a person clearly
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it;" property interests "are created
and... defined by existing rules and understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law . . . .
126. To deal with the freedom of speech implications of labor picketing, the Supreme Court developed a "speech
plus" standard in order to allow the states some degree of regulatory power over picketing. Professor Tribe offers this
clear and succinct discussion:
In Thornhill v. Alabama [310 U.S. 88 (1940)] the Court declared that peaceful picketing to publicize the fact
of a labor dispute was constitutionally protected free speech. In a series of cases culminating some 17 years later
in Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt [354 U.S. 284 (1957)], the Court upheld state laws which banned peaceful labor
picketing for illegal purposes. To distinguish these cases from Thornhill, Justice Frankfurter said that picketing
is 'speech plus' and that a state could regulate the 'plus' [See Vogt, 354 U.S. at 289-293].
Tribe, supra note 14, at § 12-7 (footnotes omitted).
The speech plus standard was explicitly recognized in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), where Chief
Justice Warren stated, in the opinion of the Court, "[this Court has held that when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements
are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on ust amendment freedoms." Id. at 376. (The O'Brien Court held that the first
amendment did not protect the burning of draft cards because of the sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element). The notion of a "plus" standard is also used in antitrust analysis, in the context of
price fixing among competitors. There, it is held that evidence of parallel price changes by competitors is not enough, by
itself, to establish the existence of an illegal price fixing conspiracy. Rather, something in addition to the mere parallelism
must be shown to establish an antitrust violation. A leading commentator in the field has stated: "the other factors that
serve to transform parallelism into conspiracy (or that allow a jury to do so) are often characterized as 'plus factors.'"
P. A tEEOA & L. Klt'tow, Atrrusr ANALYSts 306-14 (4th ed. 1988).
127. 424 U.S. 693, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 895 (1976).
128. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "U.S.
Co.sT'. amend. XIV § .
129. Paul, 424 U.S. at 701.
130. See The Supreme Court. 1975 Term, 90 HA'uv. L. REv. 56, 88 (1976). See also TRuBE, supra note 14, at
§ 10-11.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 68-86.
132. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
133. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
134. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
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Somewhat of an expansion of the Roth notion occurred in Perry. The case
involved a similar denial of due process claim brought by a professor at a state junior
college who was not rehired. The Perry Court held that the professor, previously
employed by the junior college for four years, might be able to show "the existence
of rules and understandings, promulgated and fostered by state officials that...
justify his legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment absent sufficient
cause." 
1 3 5
Although not with perfect clarity, Roth and Perry establish the boundaries of
"some recognized right of entitlement" in the procedural due process context and by
analogy can be used in the Burden Plus analysis. Included within the boundaries of
the "plus" concept should be other rights explicitly recognized by the Supreme
Court. 136
B. Discussion
The following discussion will demonstrate that the Burden Plus standard
reconciles existing precedent in a manner that provides concrete analysis for the
heretofore amorphous notion of prohibit. In addition, the Burden Plus standard will
be applied to two fact patterns, one real and one hypothetical, to demonstrate further
that it provides a clear analytical framework. Finally, the advantages of the Burden
Plus standard will be discussed and some potential criticisms will be rebutted.
1. Reconciliation of Existing Precedent
With respect to the cases where the free exercise threshold has been met, recall
that Sherbert v. Verner,137 Thomas v. Review Board, 38 Hobbie v. Appeals Com-
mission,139 and Frazee v. Department of Employment'40 all involved denial of
unemployment benefits to a claimant who refused to work because of a sincere
religious objection. Applying the Burden Plus analysis, the burden is the imposed
choice between religious conduct and monetary compensation, the "fine imposed"
notion.t 41 The "plus" is the Supreme Court's holding in Goldberg v. Kelly:142
"benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive
them.' ' 43 Thus, in all four cases there is a burden and a "plus" such that the prohibit
135. Peny, 408 U.S. at 602-03 (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) ("[welfare] benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for
persons qualified to receive them"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) ("liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control"); Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) ("oral and written dissemination of. . .religious views and doctrines is
protected by the First Amendment").
137. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
138. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
139. 480 U.S. 136 (1987). See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
140. 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989). See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
141. "Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as
would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. See supra text
accompanying note 26.
142. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
143. Id. at 262.
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threshold is met, as was found by the Court in each case. Combined with the minimal
religious sincerity requirement, explicitly reaffirmed in Frazee, the two aspects of the
free exercise threshold are met, thereby allowing the Court to undertake a balancing
test.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder'" the burden was that the compulsory education statute
required contravention of the Amish tenet that "salvation requires life in a church
community separate and apart from the world and worldly influence,"' 145 upon pain
of criminal sanctions. The "plus" was the Supreme Court's holding in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters146 that there exists a "liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control." 147 Again, the Court held
that the prohibit threshold was met, and the threshold is met under the Burden Plus
standard.
In McDaniel v. Paty148 the Court found the free exercise balance to weigh in
favor of the claimant and struck down Tennessee's prohibition on clergy serving in
the legislature. Under the Burden Plus analysis, the burden was the fact that the state
was "punishing a religious profession with the privation of a civil right" 149 and the
"plus" was the state statutory right "of its adult citizens generally to seek and hold
office as legislators . "..."150 Again, the Burden Plus analysis provides the same
result reached by the Court.
Finally, in United States v. Lee151 the Burden Plus analysis is slightly attenuated,
but still provides the proper result. Recall there that after the Court found that the
threshold was passed, the balancing test was applied and found to weigh in favor of
administration of the Social Security System against the Amish claimant's religious
objection. The burden was the contravention of the Amish tenet of providing for their
own. The "plus" was the perceived inclusion within a Social Security statutory
exemption. 152 However, the Court found Lee and his employees were not within the
express provisions of the exemption. 153 Arguably, then, the prohibit threshold was
not met and the balancing test should not have been applied. However, when one
recalls that in the pre-Roy era the required burden showing was very minimal, 154 the
Court's action is justified and the Burden Plus analysis consistent.
Now, with respect to Bowen v. Roy 155 and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary
Protective Association,156 the two cases where the threshold was not met, the Burden
Plus analysis also squares with the Court's outcome.
144. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See supra text accompanying notes 30-34.
145. Id. at 210.
146. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
147. Id. at 534-35.
148. 435 U.S. 618 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
149. Id. at 626 (quoting 5 NVWarWGs OF JAMES MADIsON 288 (G. Hunt ed. 1904)).
150. Id. See TENs. CorsT. ART. 2, §§ 9, 25, 26; TErN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1801, 8-1803 (Supp. 1977).
151. 455 U.S. 252 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
152. 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g).
153. Lee, 455 U.S. at 256. ("The exemption provided by § 1402(g) is available only to self-employed individuals
and does not apply to employers or employees." Mr. Lee was not self-employed.)
154. See supra text accompanying notes 68-86.
155. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
156. 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
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Roy involved the denial of government benefits because of the claimant's
refusal, based on a religious objection, to use a Social Security number. A majority
of the Court concurred in Chief Justice Burger's statement that, "[t]he Free Exercise
Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own
internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular cit-
izens." 157 Thus, the Court implicitly held that internal government affairs do not
burden religion in the free exercise sense and therefore the threshold was not passed
and no balancing test was applied. One will recall that Burger's opinion went on to
apply the "minimal scrutiny" balancing test discussed previously in section II of this
Comment. 158 But, as mentioned earlier, this part of his opinion was not joined by a
majority of the Court and drew a sharp dissent from Justice O'Connor. 159
The same result, failure to meet the threshold, is obtained under the Burden Plus
analysis. The burden was the same as in Sherbert, Thomas, Hobbie, and Frazee:
religious conduct versus monetary compensation. 160 But, there was no "plus": the
Goldberg holding gives a right to benefits to those "persons qualified to receive
them."' 16 1 Thus, use of a Social Security number is a qualifier to the receipt of
benefits.162 Hence, there is no "plus" and the claimant fails to meet the threshold
under the Burden Plus analysis as well.
Finally, the Burden Plus standard provides the proper result in Lyng. There, the
Court held that road construction and timber harvesting in an area used by Native
Americans for site-specific religious purposes did not prohibit the free exercise
thereof. 163 The threshold was not met, therefore a balancing test was not applied.
The Burden Plus analysis produces an identical result. The burden was the
"virtual destruction" of the Native Americans' ability to practice their religion. 164
However, there was no "plus." The "plus" could have been the Native Americans'
property rights in the high country land. But as Justice O'Connor pointed out,
" [w]hatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area, however, those rights
do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land." '1 65
Therefore, the threshold is not met under the Burden Plus analysis either.
2. Application to a Contemporary Case
While squaring with the Court's result, the Burden Plus standard provides a
superior analytical framework for a recently decided California Supreme Court case.
The case presented the unusual situation of assertion of the free exercise clause as a
157. Roy, 476 U.S. at 699.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
159. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
161. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (emphasis added). See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
162. In Roy's case, it was Aid to Families with Dependent Children. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25) provides in relevant
part: "as a condition of eligibility under the plan, each applicant for or recipient of aid shall furnish to the state agency
his social security account number." See Roy, 476 U.S. at 698.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 100-13.
164. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1326. See supra text accompanying note 99.
165. Id. at 1327 (emphasis in original).
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defense. Invoking the balancing test, the court found the balance to weigh against the
free exercise claimant.
Molko v. Holy Spirit Associationt 66 was based on the similar, but separate,
experiences of David Molko and Tracy Leal. Both unwittingly became "members"
of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon's Unification Church. Both had become involved
with the group only after group members had repeatedly denied any religious
affiliation. After each had spent several months with the group, the religious
orientation was revealed, but each stayed to undergo "advanced training." Upon
completion of their training, both were sent out in public to "witness." While
witnessing, each was abducted by "deprogrammers" hired by their parents; shortly
after abduction, both renounced any association with the Unification Church. The
two then brought suit in state court against the Church alleging willful misrepresen-
tation, reliance upon which resulted in both emotional and financial damages.
In defense, the Church claimed that the state-law tort action impermissibly
burdened rights protected by the free exercise clause. In analyzing the free exercise
claim, Justice Stanley Mosk found that the religion aspect of the threshold was met,
stating, "Molko and Leal do not contest the sincerity of . . . the Church's be-
liefs .... "167 He impliedly found that the prohibit aspect of the threshold had been
met, stating, "[g]overnment action burdening religious conduct is subject to a
balancing test .... ,"168
Mosk found the burden on free exercise to be "marginal" 169 and then went on
to "consider whether a compelling state interest" 17 0 justified the burden. He found
two such interests: the state's interest in protecting safety, peace, and order, and the
state's interest in protecting the family institution.t 71 Mosk completed application of
the strict scrutiny balancing test by stating, "we perceive no less restrictive alternative
available .... 172 and concluded that "the federal ... Constitution [does not bar]
Molko and Leal from bringing traditional fraud actions against the Church .... " 173
The Burden Plus standard provides the same result, but adds substantial clarity
to Justice Mosk's threshold analysis. The burden is tort liability. The "plus" is the
United States Supreme Court's recognition in Heffron v. International Society for
Krishna Consciousness174 that "oral and written dissemination of... religious views
166. 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122, 762 P.2d 46 (1988). See also Reidinger, Puncturing the Faith Defense,
ABA JOURNAL, Feb. 1989, at 89-90.
167. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1115, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 134, 762 P.2d at 58 (emphasis omitted).
168. Id. at 1113, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 132, 762 P.2d at 56.
169. Id. at 1117, 252 Cal. Rptr. 136, 762 P.2d at 60. Justice Mosk stated:
Yet these burdens, while real, are not substantial. Being subject to liability for fraud does not in any way or
degree prevent or inhibit Church members from operating their religious communities, worshipping as they see
fit, freely associating with one another, selling or distributing literature, proselytizing on the street, soliciting
funds, or generally spreading Reverend Moon's message among the population. It certainly does not, like the
educational requirement in Yoder, compel Church members to perform acts "'at odds with fundamental tenets
of their religious beliefs."
Id. (citation omitted).
170. Id. Note the use of the strict scrutiny balancing test.
171. Id. at 1118, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 136, 762 P.2d at 60.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1119, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 137, 762 P.2d at 61.
174. 452 U.S. 640 (1980).
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and doctrines is protected by the First Amendment."1 75 Thus, the prohibit threshold
is met and the strict scrutiny balancing test is properly applied.
This application demonstrates a major advantage of the Burden Plus standard:
establishment with clarity that there is a threshold requirement to invocation of free
exercise protection and clarification of how that threshold is met.
3. Hypothetical Application
Suppose that in light of the recent controversies surrounding the alleged
improprieties of several television evangelists, a state legislature passes a law
prohibiting television broadcasts by all such persons. Suppose too that the court
hearing the "televangelists'" challenge holds that the enactment is a valid "time,
place and manner" regulation (because of the existence of other venues such as live
performances and radio broadcasts) such that the televangelists are left to rely upon
a free exercise claim. Should the strict scrutiny balancing test be applied? Given the
statute's substantial infringement on religion, most would intuitively say "yes."
Under the Burden Plus analysis, the response is also "yes."
Sincerity is conceded, meeting the religion aspect of the threshold. The Burden
Plus standard is used to analyze the prohibit aspect. The burden is obvious: ''virtual
destruction" of the respective religions 176 since the television audience provides a
substantial part, if not the entirety, of a televangelist's congregation. The "plus"
would be the previously mentioned recognition in Heffronl77 that "oral and written
dissemination of . . . religious views and doctrines is protected by the First
Amendment." 178
Hence, the Burden Plus analysis allows the court, consistent with Supreme
Court precedent, to apply the strict scrutiny balancing test in a manner that provides
a clear analysis, in a situation where most would agree that such a strict judicial
examination should be undertaken.
4. Advantages
The Burden Plus standard reconciles existing free exercise clause precedents and
in that sense provides a superior analytical framework for resolution of future claims.
In addition, it provides a concrete standard by which the existence of the heretofore
amorphous "burden" can be established.
The Burden Plus standard provides for certainty in an area of the law left
uncertain by the recent Supreme Court decisions in Roy and Lyng. It allows a court
to determine, with certainty and consistent with existing precedent, whether or not to
apply the strict scrutiny balancing test.
The Burden Plus standard provides clarity in the analysis of free exercise claims.
175. Id. at 647.
176. Recall that "virtual destruction" was used by the Court of Appeals to describe the result of the government
action in Lyng. See supra text accompanying note 99.
177. 452 U.S. 640 (1980). See supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
178. Id. at 647.
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It makes clear that there is in fact a threshold requirement to the invocation of the free
exercise balancing test. And, of course, it makes clear how that threshold is met.
Further, the Burden Plus standard is consistent with the notion that there is a
"dynamic tension" between the free exercise clause and the establishment clause. 179
A finding in favor of a free exercise claimant may tend toward an impermissible
"establishment" of that religion. However, by requiring an additional right or
entitlement, the Burden Plus standard allows a court to use the free exercise clause
to "carve" a "permissible zone of accommodation" out of the establishment
clause. 180
Perhaps the most impressive advantage of the Burden Plus standard is the fact
that it is consistent with the intent of the Framers of the Constitution. After all, in
addition to allowing for the free exercise of religion, the first amendment also
prohibits the government from promoting the establishment of religion. The Framers
realized that there must be a line where accommodation stops. The location of that
line is where the accommodation tends towards establishment. 181 James Madison, in
a statement that had the support of Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike, said that the
federal government had not the "shadow of a right . . . to intermeddle with
religion."' 182 Madison, along with Thomas Jefferson was "as much concerned with
freedom from religion as with freedom of religion .... "183 Even Patrick Henry, a
staunch supporter of religious liberty, "called for a ban on the establishment of one
sect in preference of others." 184 The Burden Plus standard requires the claimant to
have an additional right or entitlement insuring that if the court finds in favor of the
claimant, it can be seen as upholding the right or entitlement as much as the free
exercise of religion. A decision resting on two such aspects will have less of a
tendency to be viewed as a decision that promotes establishment than would a
decision based solely on the religious aspect.
5. Rebuttal of Potential Criticisms
One may contend that there is an "absolute" right to invoke free exercise clause
protection upon showing that there is a burden on the free exercise of religion. There
are two responses to this contention. First, it is simply not true in light of the Lyng
decision, in which it was conceded that a burden existed but the Court rejected the
invocation of free exercise clause protection. Second, there can be no "absolute"
right because the free exercise clause, as discussed earlier, is co-existent with the
establishment clause. Burdens upon religious claimants have been upheld where the
179. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
180. Recall that this is Professor Tribe's description of the conflict between the free exercise clause and the
establishment clause. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
181. See generally CuRRy, supra note 12.
182. CuRRY, supra note 12, at 208.
183. P. KAuPER, RmGnioN AND THE CoNsrrtmox 48 (1964).
184. CuRY, supra note 12, at 213.
1989] 1055
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
relief of such a burden would be seen as promoting impermissible establishment
interests. 185
A second criticism may be that there really is not a threshold requirement to the
invocation of free exercise clause protection. Although the Supreme Court has never
explicitly stated that there is a threshold requirement, a close reading of the free
exercise cases will reveal that a threshold analysis has been undertaken in each case.
The Burden Plus standard clarifies that, indeed, a threshold exists, and makes clear
how the threshold is met.
A third criticism may be that an explicit threshold analysis in addition to the
balancing analysis is simply a waste of time. However, use of an analytical standard
that promotes both clarity and certainty, as discussed earlier, can hardly be viewed as
a waste. Further, a logical analysis is not a waste of time when the rights implicated
are so important that they were included in thefirst amendment to the Constitution.
Finally, the critic may question the propriety of a "plus" standard. As discussed
at the beginning of this section proposing the Burden Plus standard, a "plus"
standard has been previously used in the first amendment context. The notion of a
"plus" standard is also used both in the procedural due process and antitrust
contexts. Further, the cases establishing the boundaries of a right or entitlement in the
due process context 86 can be used by analogy in the free exercise context to establish
the proper parameters of the "plus." In addition, the "plus" insures that when a free
exercise claim is upheld, it is unlikely to tend toward impermissible establishment
interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current doctrine with respect to the burden aspect of the free exercise clause
is truly a "gray area." 1 87 It is not asserted that the Burden Plus standard has any
talismanic properties. However, this Comment's application of the standard demon-
strates the analytical clarity and certainty that the Burden Plus standard provides.
These and several other substantial advantages have been advanced, and several
legitimate criticisms have been rebutted.
It is ironic that in this year of the bicentennial anniversary of the ratification of
the Bill of Rights, the protection afforded by the religion clause of the first
amendment has been pared down. The free exercise claimant who previously put on
the armor of a "strict scrutiny" balancing test against governmental impingement on
religious activity by merely showing a sincere belief and a burden on the activity,
185. See, e.g., Estate of Thorton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (Connecticut statute requiring all employers
to give any employee the day off on that employee's Sabbath struck down as violative of the establishment clause).
186. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). For a
discussion of the development of the interests protected by due process safeguards, see TuBE, supra note 14, §§ 10-9,
10-10, 10-11.
187. Fletch (MCA Video 1985). Gray because in light of Lyng, it is unclear what constitutes a "prohibition" for
the purposes of invoking the protection of the free exercise clause. Lyng establishes that "frustration" or "inhibition"
does not constitute a prohibition, but leaves open the question of what does constitute a prohibition. Under the Burden
Plus standard there is a prohibition (allowing the claimant to don the armor of strict scrutiny) if the claimant can show
interference with religious activites or beliefs and the existence of an appropriate plus factor.
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now faces a considerably higher threshold in attempting to don the knight's garb to
do battle with those attempting to infringe on religious rights. This Comment has
proposed and discussed the Burden Plus standard as a superior analytical framework
to determine when the free exercise threshold is met and as a way to ensure "liberty
and justice for all."
Thomas E. Geyer

